Two Roads Diverged in a Yellow Wood
The cross-Strait political situation is headed in a very unpleasant direction.
Taipei has been playing the line between Washington and Beijing. It continues to waffle about with the arms package the US offered in 2001, no decision has been made in the Legislative Yuan. By doing so, Taipei has made its opinion clear: "Weapons? We don't need no stinkin' weapons!" Taipei knows the US is still committed to defend Taiwan. While some people read the Taiwan Relations Act and see that no where is it written that Washington has to come to Taiwan's aid, it has been said by policymakers and by senior State Department officials multiple times, and that's where it counts.
Taipei also realizes that China wants to keep improving relations with the US, and vice versa. So it feels safe in spending the $18 billion elsewhere and thinking about cutting the defense budget. (If this doesn't set off alarms in Washington, I don't know what will.) If that wasn't enough, Taiwan is trying to change its name officially to just Taiwan (ie. another move towards formal independence), and it recently pissed and moaned at the WHO when its application for admission to the organization under the name "Taiwan" was rejected. Premier Su Tseng-chang went so far as to accuse KMT party members of "kowtowing" to Beijing when they attended a forum on cross-Strait trade on the mainland.President Chen rejected Beijing's offer to bring the Olympic torch through Taiwan on its route. Now he visited the U.S., digitally, despite protests and warnings from both Beijing and Washington.
Taiwan is growing bold under the American wing. I dread the possibilities after the Olympics. Under Beijing's "peaceful rise" policy, there is something disturbing brewing. Defense spending has risen dramatically, much higher than it says, and Beijing's reach extends far past the force needed to defend itself against its neighbors. It moves all of its most recent and technologically advanced forces to the regions directly opposite the Straits. And the anti satellite missile test earlier this year casts serious doubt on the US's ability to defend Taiwan.
What happens is up to China, as it has been, but Taipei is egging Beijing on, and I think it's an issue of domestic politics. Chen wants to publicly ruffle the PRC's feathers to galvanize support for the DPP. Playing with fire for a larger share of political power. Beijing wouldn't dare do anything with the Olympics coming up, but what about afterward, while American forces are still tied up in the Middle East and South Asia? In the event of a "preemptive" anti-satellite strike by the PLA, without adequate satellite coverage, the 7th Fleet and any forces the Japanese, ROK, or Australia committed wouldn't be able to take on the massive military array that is sitting across the strait.
I wonder what is going on in Beijing. I think for the moment, it has bigger fish to fry than Taipei. But what are those fish? Where are all those troops and updated equipment going to go?
The situation is rapidly changing in East Asia. Japan is moving to repeal Article 9 of its constitution; the article that bans use of force as a means to resolve international disputes, while at the same time its defense spending rises consistently (Japan has the world's fifth largest navy). The U.S. is shifting its strategic defense focus away from Japan and Korea and toward Australia, installing submarine bases, missile-detection sites, and troop garrisons in the north of the continent... but yet Australia's trade focus is moving away from the U.S. and Japan toward China. Taiwan is becoming more rabid in its independence gambit.
The question is: what will China do?
Taipei has been playing the line between Washington and Beijing. It continues to waffle about with the arms package the US offered in 2001, no decision has been made in the Legislative Yuan. By doing so, Taipei has made its opinion clear: "Weapons? We don't need no stinkin' weapons!" Taipei knows the US is still committed to defend Taiwan. While some people read the Taiwan Relations Act and see that no where is it written that Washington has to come to Taiwan's aid, it has been said by policymakers and by senior State Department officials multiple times, and that's where it counts.
Taipei also realizes that China wants to keep improving relations with the US, and vice versa. So it feels safe in spending the $18 billion elsewhere and thinking about cutting the defense budget. (If this doesn't set off alarms in Washington, I don't know what will.) If that wasn't enough, Taiwan is trying to change its name officially to just Taiwan (ie. another move towards formal independence), and it recently pissed and moaned at the WHO when its application for admission to the organization under the name "Taiwan" was rejected. Premier Su Tseng-chang went so far as to accuse KMT party members of "kowtowing" to Beijing when they attended a forum on cross-Strait trade on the mainland.President Chen rejected Beijing's offer to bring the Olympic torch through Taiwan on its route. Now he visited the U.S., digitally, despite protests and warnings from both Beijing and Washington.
Taiwan is growing bold under the American wing. I dread the possibilities after the Olympics. Under Beijing's "peaceful rise" policy, there is something disturbing brewing. Defense spending has risen dramatically, much higher than it says, and Beijing's reach extends far past the force needed to defend itself against its neighbors. It moves all of its most recent and technologically advanced forces to the regions directly opposite the Straits. And the anti satellite missile test earlier this year casts serious doubt on the US's ability to defend Taiwan.
What happens is up to China, as it has been, but Taipei is egging Beijing on, and I think it's an issue of domestic politics. Chen wants to publicly ruffle the PRC's feathers to galvanize support for the DPP. Playing with fire for a larger share of political power. Beijing wouldn't dare do anything with the Olympics coming up, but what about afterward, while American forces are still tied up in the Middle East and South Asia? In the event of a "preemptive" anti-satellite strike by the PLA, without adequate satellite coverage, the 7th Fleet and any forces the Japanese, ROK, or Australia committed wouldn't be able to take on the massive military array that is sitting across the strait.
I wonder what is going on in Beijing. I think for the moment, it has bigger fish to fry than Taipei. But what are those fish? Where are all those troops and updated equipment going to go?
The situation is rapidly changing in East Asia. Japan is moving to repeal Article 9 of its constitution; the article that bans use of force as a means to resolve international disputes, while at the same time its defense spending rises consistently (Japan has the world's fifth largest navy). The U.S. is shifting its strategic defense focus away from Japan and Korea and toward Australia, installing submarine bases, missile-detection sites, and troop garrisons in the north of the continent... but yet Australia's trade focus is moving away from the U.S. and Japan toward China. Taiwan is becoming more rabid in its independence gambit.
The question is: what will China do?
Labels: history, PLA, politics, Taiwan Strait
